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It has been an eventful year for the Faculty.
As we anticipated last year, we were given
permission to name the Chair founded in
1896, the ‘Bertrand Russell Professorship 
of Philosophy’. The great generosity of 
past alumni made this possible, and we
repeat last year’s gratitude for all the
donations and support you have given. 
It was Russell’s combination of distinction
as a logician and philosopher, work as a
public intellectual, and visibility as a world-
renowned symbol of the engagement of
philosophy in public life that ﬁnally saw 
him edge ahead.
This year the Faculty again mounted a
variety of public events. Fraser MacBride
gave a fascinating and well-received talk
entitled ‘The Dark Matter of Cambridge
Philosophy’ at the Alumni Weekend. The
‘dark matter’ was made up of those more or
less forgotten philosophers whose lights
were partially eclipsed by the more
memorable giants of the subject. 
Cain Todd, a recent graduate student
now working at Lancaster University and
the University of Fribourg in Switzerland,
talked at the Cambridge Festival of Ideas
about the delightful and puzzling topic 
of our emotional responses to ﬁctional
events and characters. Also Tim Scanlon
from Harvard, one of the world’s most
distinguished moral philosophers, gave 
the annual Routledge Lecture entitled
‘Value in Morality and Politics’ to a large 
and appreciative audience. 
An unusual event was a conference 
on philosophy and cloud computing,
brilliantly organized by graduate student
Tom Simpson, and supported by Microsoft.
It was pleasing to ﬁnd out how well
engineers and philosophers could
cooperate to think about things like trust,
privacy, property, and exploitation in the
virtual world. Finally, for three months 
this summer Professor Frank Jackson is 
a Leverhulme Trust Visiting Professor,
having surmounted the formidable 
hurdles put in front of visiting academics 
by the immigration authorities, and will 
be giving four lectures.
Sadly I am rapidly approaching
retirement in September, and this is 
the last Chairman’s letter that I will be
privileged to write. My successor will be
Professor Huw Price, currently the Challis
Professor of Philosophy at the University 
of Sydney. Huw has contributed hugely 
to many diﬀerent areas of philosophy: an
indication may be found at his website
(http://homepage.mac.com/huw.price/pub
lications.html). Amongst his many papers
and books, the marvelous Time’s Arrow and
Archimedes’ Point has reached the widest
audience, even gaining applause from
professional physicists, which is no easy
thing to do. It is gratifying for me to know
that the Bertrand Russell Chair will have
such a distinguished occupant. 
Last year I mentioned that the Faculty
was prioritizing graduate support as the
target of our fundraising ambitions. I am
especially pleased to say that we are
already able to oﬀer partial support to 
some half-dozen graduate students, while
one donor in particular has undertaken 
to oﬀer full support to a PhD student for
the foreseeable future. With the decline 
in public funding, this support is becoming
ever more crucial for the future of graduate
and undergraduate education. 
Times are certainly turbulent in the
university world. Nobody can know what
the regime of increased fees and vanishing
public support will imply for disciplines in
the humanities. Nobody knows either, quite
how the Government’s notorious ‘impact’
agenda will itself impact upon subjects
whose value lies not in small measurable
eﬀects, but in the incalculably long and slow
diﬀusion of ideas and modes of thinking.
But as I hand over the reins to others, I am
happy to reassure readers that the Faculty
intends to meet future challenges with its
intellectual ideals, its determination, and its
morale, as high as ever.
From the Chair
Simon Blackburn
Huw Price: Appointed to the Bertrand Russell Professorship.
ISSN 2046-9632
Very few know what it’s like to give an
inaugural lecture. But for the audience, it is
altogether different from other academic
talks. The room is invariably large and
unfamiliar, and full of strangers. There is
quiet excitement in the air, and nowhere 
to sit. And there is no reason to go — at
least in the sense that it does not matter
for Tripos, it is not likely to benefit the
research of the academics who gather
from scattered disciplines, and the 
turnout is usually so great that no one
would notice you were missing. There are
always free drinks it is true, but that is a
reason to show up for the drinks, not for
the talk beforehand.
And so it was on a cold night in
December, in the last week of Michaelmas,
when Tim Crane gave his inaugural 
lecture as the Knightbridge Professor of
Philosophy. But as much as every inaugural
lecture is the same, this one was different:
for Professor Crane made intelligible, and
interpreted as distinctly human, why we
were all there.
Under the title “What is distinctive about
human thought?” Crane defended the
Aristotelian thesis that people by nature
desire to know — not just for instrumental
reasons, for the benefits that accrue to the
well-informed, but for its own sake. After a
lively opening that described the scandals
that attached to the Professorship in its
early years at Peterhouse, the college to
which the Knightbridge now returns, 
Crane turned to the argument.
What is distinctive about human
thought is not, as many allege, that
humans alone are capable of belief, by
virtue of being capable of language. 
A creature does not need language to
Political
Philosophy at
Cambridge
Political Philosophy consolidated its
position in the Faculty this year with
two new research seminars. Both
focus on contemporary political
philosophy, an area in which the
Faculty is particularly strong, but
which was previously somewhat
eclipsed at University level by
historical approaches. The two new
events are the Political Philosophy
Workshop and the Seminar in
Political Thought. Both events bring
together Political Philosophers from
around the University, including
POLIS, Law, History, HPS, Classics 
and Philosophy, with a mailing list 
of around 60 specialists.
The Workshop is convened by Clare
Chambers (Philosophy) and enables
detailed, high-level discussion of work
in progress by Cambridge scholars.
Since papers are read in advance, 
the workshop consists of 90 minutes
of focused engagement with the
arguments, which is stimulating for 
all participants. 
The Seminar is a visiting speaker
seminar, convened jointly by Clare
Chambers and Duncan Bell (POLIS). 
In Michaelmas Term the Seminar
hosted four visitors. Andrea
Sangiovanni (KCL) gave an excellent
start to the Seminar with a paper
titled “La verità eﬀettuale della 
cosa’: On the Practice-Dependence 
of Political Values”. David Miller
(Oxford) told the Seminar that his
title, “The Idea of Global Citizenship”,
was inspired by a poster display 
at a school celebrating ‘global
citizenship’, an idea which is sadly
nonsensical. Anne Phillips (LSE)
argued against the commonly-used
concept of property in the person, 
in “Do we own our Bodies? More
Thoughts on Property in the Person
and in the Body.” Finally, Zoﬁa
Stemplowska (Warwick) exhorted 
us to accept a duty of justice to take
up the slack left when others fail to
do their fair share, in “Responsibility
for Refugees: A Duty to Do More 
Than One’s Fair Share?” 
Cambridge contemporary 
political philosophers look forward 
to hosting more visitors and
continuing to subject themselves 
to concentrated critique.
represent the world in a way that warrants
the title ‘belief’, rather language helps 
a creature distinguish between the way 
the world is and the way others take 
it to be. We humans do not merely
represent the world as thus and so, we 
also systematically represent the beliefs 
of others as being correct or incorrect.
There is no evidence that animals can 
do this. Chimps, for instance, have beliefs
about what other chimps know, but they
do not have beliefs about what other
chimps believe. The difference is that while
chimps can believe that a certain relation
holds between another chimp and her
environment (knowing, seeing, wanting),
they cannot isolate the mental state of 
that other chimp and think of it as being
correct or incorrect.
The capacity to think of mental states 
as true or false is part of what gives us 
what Crane believes to be distinctive 
about human thought: the ability to desire
the truth for its own sake. This Crane takes,
not as the claim that we can desire the
truth simpliciter, just because it is true, 
but that we can desire the truth on some
subject matter, not for instrumental
reasons, but for its own sake or value.
Once again the argument is partly
empirical: Is there evidence that people
sometimes, or at least can, desire
knowledge for its own sake, and that
animals do not or cannot? The answer 
is yes, at least prima facie. Humans, from 
a very early age, have a capacity for
declarative pointing, which is pointing 
to draw attention to something, but not 
in the service of some immediate interest.
Animals that seem to point or signal to
others, in contrast, are at most
communicating danger (“Watch out!”) or
food (“Pig out!”) or reproductive benefit
(“Hey baby!”). What they cannot do, and
what we can do, is point and mean
something like “Check this out”. Not for
safety or for food or for propagation, 
but to know it for its own sake.
Such was the thesis and thus ran 
the argument. Does it get to the truth 
on this matter? It may, and so F
http://bit.ly/craneinaugural (for the sake 
of knowledge itself ).
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Inaugural Lecture: 
What is Distinctive 
about Human Thought?
Nick Treanor
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Aspects of Philosophy 
at Cambridge
Alexis Papazoglou
increasingly esoteric questions against 
a background of controversial, yet
unquestioned assumptions. 
Tim Lewens (HPS) and David Runciman
(POLIS) were concerned with two
paradigms in their areas that they 
found problematic. Naturalism, for 
Lewens, seemed to be a philosophical
assumption that sometimes — especially
when it was interpreted as thinking of
philosophical questions like causality with
our eye on the sciences — muddies the
waters instead of making things clearer, and
is used as an ‘add-on’ to give an argument
the authority of science. Runciman, on the
other hand, criticised some attempts of
oﬀering a political philosophy by thinking 
of real politics, rather than providing ideal
theories of justice. 
Finally, Jane Heal (Philosophy) was 
also concerned with the pitfalls of
philosophy. For Heal the dangers lie in 
pure philosophy — philosophy divorced
from other disciplines. Part of the success 
of much of early 20th century Cambridge
philosophy, she argued, was down to the
institutional structure of the Philosophy
Faculty, then the Moral Sciences Faculty,
which included history, psychology,
economics, linguistics etc. 
Podcasts of some of the talks are available
from the Philosophy Faculty website. 
Philosophy at Cambridge doesn’t just take
place in the Philosophy Faculty. Realising
the extent of that truth, I decided to host 
an event, bringing together Cambridge
academics who approach philosophy from
diﬀerent contexts, and ask them to talk
about their conception of ‘philosophy’.
The result was a two-day conference with
12 speakers from 9 diﬀerent faculties and
departments, held at Hughes Hall as part 
of the College’s 125th anniversary. Part of
the purpose of this event was to make
explicit the plurality of perspectives on
philosophy living in the University of
Cambridge today. 
It seemed to me that the trend in
thought preoccupying many of the
speakers was the question “What is bad
philosophy?”. Tim Crane, Knightbridge
Professor of Philosophy, inaugurated this
theme. After convincingly denouncing 
a dichotomy between analytic and
continental philosophy — falsely created 
by people who want to ignore certain 
texts — he exposed caricatures of analytic
philosophy that locate its value in some
alleged special relation with logic, language
and the natural sciences. Crane located 
‘the death of philosophy’ in what he 
called, borrowing Thomas Kuhn’s
terminology, ‘normal philosophy’:
philosophy that is preoccupied with
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Conferences at Cambridge
Principia at 100
Peter Smith
In A Mathematician’s Apology (CUP, 1940), 
G. H. Hardy recalls Bertrand Russell telling
him of a horrible dream:
He was in the top floor of the
University Library, about AD 2100. 
A library assistant was going round the
shelves carrying an enormous bucket,
taking down books, glancing at them,
restoring them to the shelves or
dumping them into the bucket. At last
he came to three large volumes which
Russell could recognize as the last
surviving copy of Principia
Mathematica. He took down one of the
volumes, turned over a few pages,
seemed puzzled for a moment by the
curious symbolism, closed the volume,
balanced it in his hand and hesitated...
Well, a hundred years after the publication
of the first volume of the triple-decker 
he wrote with Whitehead, the book 
is certainly still held in enough regard 
for its centennial to have been marked 
by a number of conferences. True, I 
doubt that many who attended them 
(or indeed many of the speakers) had
actually read more than half the first
volume of Principia. And almost no-one
now believes that the logicist project 
that the work tries to pull off can succeed,
or at least not as its authors conceived it.
But the influence the book has had can
hardly be exaggerated.
Cambridge’s contribution to the
celebrations was a two-day symposium
held in Trinity in November 2010. 
The driving force behind this was 
Nik Sultana, a graduate student in
computer science, and indeed a number 
of the speakers were computer scientists
(this gave the Cambridge meeting 
an interestingly different flavour to 
other centennial celebrations). The
theoretical computer scientists’ 
interest in Principia is, of course, as a 
key source for the ‘theory of types’ and 
the development of a typed language.
Though it is a nice question — one
addressed by Randall Holmes — 
whether Russell and Whitehead’s 
ramified type theory can be precisified 
to the point where Principia proofs 
could pass muster with a computer 
proof-checker. 
The symposium was an enjoyable
success: for abstracts and some 
of the papers, do go to:
www.srcf.ucam.org/principia. 
And Russell’s shade can relax and 
look forward to the next centenary...
Conference poster
Christiana Spens 
Before Cambridge 
my ﬁrst novel, The
Wrecking Ball, was
published. After 
that exciting but
overwhelming
experience, it was a
relief to set my mind 
to something so disciplined as Philosophy.
I wasn’t exactly a natural with Logic, 
but nevertheless enjoyed the course
(Aesthetics especially), and it seeped 
into extra-curricular activities here: 
I curated an art exhibition, Companions 
in Guilt, with two other philosophers
(Emma Whittall and Matthew Drage) — 
and this term, I’m writing a faux ‘lecture
series’ for Varsity on “The Philosophy 
of Gossip Girl”, interpreting the popular 
TV series according to Nietzsche. 
After leaving Cambridge this summer, 
I hope to ﬁnish another short novel, 
The Idiots’ Club. 
James Angel
As a King’s third year
philosopher, I find
myself tired of the
obscure metaphysical
questions that initially
got me hooked on
philosophy. Instead,
after three years of
climate and social justice activism, which
have encompassed everything from
negotiating meetings to breaking the law, 
I am interested in whether philosophy 
can be of use in affecting the radical social
change that I believe is necessary. I plan,
after Cambridge, to continue my activism;
this is motivated by moral and political
concerns raised by philosophy. 
Mark Fiddaman
Mark is President of the legendary
Cambridge Footlights and regularly
performs in a mixture of sketches and
stand-up, as well as plays. 
Emerald Paston
I started performing
comedy songs, along
with some stand up, in
my first year here. Since
then, I’ve performed 
in numerous smokers
and balls around
Cambridge and at 
the Edinburgh Festival. I also managed 
to get through to the final of the Chortle
Student Comedian of the Year Award 
last summer. 
I’ve just found out that I’ve got through
to the final five of Comedy Central Live’s
Funniest Student Award and will get 
to perform at the Comedy Store in 
London. Unfortunately, I don’t have 
any songs about philosophy — I think
Monty Python may have cornered the
market there.
Luke Hawksbee
I got involved in 
setting up the National
Campaign Against 
Fees & Cuts by being on
the steering committee
of Education Not for
Sale (since dissolved
into NCAFC). I’ve been
politically active in other ways too:
speaking at conferences and day-schools,
holding meetings and organising protests,
running local campaigns and fundraising
etc. I’m currently focusing on educating
myself and others — I’m arranging
seminars on left-wing theory/ history 
for local sixth formers. My goal is to 
help make the world more equal and
democratic, and the first step is to 
defend public services.
Odin Mühlenbein
I co-founded
clicks4charity
(www.clicks4charity.
net), a student-run
social business in 
2007. We provide 
online fundraising 
tools for non-profit
organizations, including major German
NGOs like SOS Children’s Villages and
Greenpeace, and we co-operate with 
over 400 online shops. Clicks4charity 
has been profiled in major German
newspapers and on television, and 
we’ve received two awards. My current
goal is to put other projects aside in order
to make some progress with my PhD,
which isn’t easy, because I already have
new business ideas!
Joe Pitt-Rashid
I started out as a
photographer at
student paper Varsity,
then features editor,
before being appointed
full editor for the
Michaelmas term. 
I also played Varsity
Rugby League in my first-year and have
worked with the Cambridge Union and
Beyond Profit, a student run organization
educating people about socially
responsible business. At the moment, 
I am working on a short film and trying 
to dedicate more time to my degree. 
I worked for the Ministry of Defence 
last summer and will soon be starting 
a Dual-Degree in International Affairs 
at Science-Po in Paris and Columbia
University in New York, if I can find 
the funding.
Hugo Hickson
I co-founded 
Beyond Profit
(www.beyondprofit.
org.uk) in May 2010. 
We are a student
society promoting
social enterprise and
sustainable business,
consisting of over 700 student members
and 11 professionals in an advisory 
role. Each term we put on workshops,
discussions and networking events 
aiming at dispelling the myth that 
earning money and making a positive
difference are at odds with each other. 
We hope to aid, inform and inspire the 
next generation of business leaders and
social entrepreneurs. 
James Counsell 
James was President of the Cambridge
Union Society in Michaelmas Term 2010.
This is the largest student society in the
United Kingdom and the oldest debating
society in the world. 
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People
We’re fortunate to have many highly motivated and able students in
Philosophy. But their talents are not just limited to the academic arena —
many of them excel in their non-academic activities too. Our current
students are a particularly talented bunch, with impressive achievements
in comedy, fiction, business, and political activism among other things.
Here are some success stories.
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Alumni News
Ms Carlene Firmin (Fitzwilliam 2002–05) has been awarded 
an MBE in the New Year’s Honours list for services to Girls’ 
and Women’s Issues. Carlene is Senior Policy Officer for 
Race on the Agenda, and Chief Executive Officer for the 
Gag Project. 
Professor Jonathan Lear (Clare 1970–73) received a 
2009 Distinguished Achievement Award from the Andrew 
W. Mellon Foundation.
Professor Anthony Appiah (Clare 1972–75) was named 
one of the top 100 global thinkers by Foreign Policy
(December 2010).
Dr Charlotte Werndl, Lecturer at the London School of
Economics has been awarded the 2011 James T. Cushing
Memorial Prize in History and Philosophy of Physics for work 
done during her PhD at Cambridge. She is being honoured 
for her paper, “What Are the New Implications of Chaos 
for Unpredictability?” published in The British Journal for 
the Philosophy of Science in 2009.
Mr Jonathon Brown (Pembroke 1974–78) has had a large
painting of a storm in Nice, accepted by the International
Museum of Naive Art Anatole Jakowsky, for its permanent
collection. 
Awards, Honours and Promotions
John Marenbon has been conferred 
the title ‘Honorary Professor of Medieval
Philosophy’ at Cambridge.
Afﬁliated lecturer, Derek Matravers
has been made a Professor by the 
Open University.
Clare Chambers was promoted to
University Senior Lecturer.
Tim Lewens has been awarded the 
ﬁrst Crausaz Wordsworth Fellowship in
Philosophy. Its aim is to enable scholars
developing interests in philosophical study
from an interdisciplinary perspective to
spend additional time exploring these.
Arrivals
This year Maike Albertzart was appointed
as temporary lecturer in October 2010
while Dr Olsaretti was on leave. 
Richard Child was appointed as a Mellon
Postdoctoral Fellow in Social Justice and
Criminal Justice for two years.
Steinvör Árnadóttir joined the Faculty 
on a 2-year Leverhulme Early Career
Fellowship with matching funding from
the Isaac Newton Trust. 
Special Lectures
Members of the Faculty are often invited 
to give lectures around the globe. Onora
O’Neill visited New Zealand to give the
inaugural Royal Society Aronui Lecture Series
on ‘Two Cultures Fifty Years On’ in September
2010. She also gave the Woodbridge
Lectures at Columbia University in April
2011. Simon Blackburn gave the inaugural
‘Philosophy in the World’ Lecture at Leiden
University College in March 2011. 
Onora O’Neil and Simon Blackburn
will also speak at the popular Cambridge
Series at the Hay Literary Festival, May 27th
to June 5th 2011. 
Student Prizes
The Matthew Buncombe prize for best
overall performance in the MPhil degree
was awarded to Owen Griffiths (St John’s). 
The Craig Taylor prize for best performance
in Part IB went to James Angel (Kings). 
The Part II prize was shared between 
Zoe Johnson King (Fitzwilliam); Felicity
Loudon (Corpus Christi) and William
Ratoff (Robinson).
Appointments
Hallvard Lillehammer was appointed 
to a Senior Research Fellowship at 
Churchill College. 
Niklas Möller has been awarded a 2-year,
full-time funded project on the philosophy
of risk at Stockholm University after his EC
Marie-Curie Fellowship here in the Faculty
finishes in June 2011.
Florian Steinberger joined the Ludwig
Maximilian University in Munich as
Assistant Professor in Logic and Philosophy
of Language.
Four new Research Fellows have been
appointed at Cambridge from Michaelmas
2011: Lorna Finlayson (Cambridge) and
Jessica Leech (Geneva) at King’s, Will
Davies (Oxford) at Churchill, and Thomas
Land (Chicago) at Corpus Christi.
Of our graduate students, Adam Caulton
has a 2-year Jacobsen Fellowship at LSE,
and Cristian Constantinescu was
appointed to a lectureship at Birkbeck.
The Faculty
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Turning the World Upside Down
Nigel Crisp
Lord Nigel Crisp
If I were to say that a degree in philosophy
— or in my case moral sciences — was 
a very good preparation for a career 
in healthcare management you might
assume that I was referring to the many
day to day dilemmas inherent in providing
services for worried, sick and dying people
and their relatives.
As a hospital Chief Executive I was
certainly faced with decisions about how
we should handle “advance directives” 
and “do not resuscitate policies”. More
problematically, I recall being drawn 
into the deliberations — and occasional
tensions between relatives, carers and
clinicians — about when to carry on
treatment in intensive care or when to
support a digniﬁed death. (I hired a clinical
ethicist, but that’s another story). As NHS
Chief Executive I also played a part in
priority setting in a context where
everything is a priority for somebody 
and where decision making on uncertain
evidence was sometimes better than 
no decision at all. 
This is all true, but only part of my 
point. More cynically, you might think 
that some philosophical training was
useful in a world where more nonsense
appears to be talked than in any other. A
random sample makes the point well.
“Because costs are rising so fast, we must start
charging for healthcare”. (But costs are
generally higher in countries where they
charge and there are alternative
approaches). “Cancer patients in the UK have
poorer survival rates than in Bulgaria”. (We
don’t know: in the UK we follow patients
up better and know how long they live).
“What about “demand for healthcare is
infinite”? (No it’s not; most men avoid the
doctor like the plague). 
Statements like these are full of false
assumptions, inaccurate inferences and
misleading arguments but also for the
most part contain a grain of truth or draw
attention to an important point. If you are
running a health service it is important to
be able to make the arguments well and
spot the ﬂaws — or to put it crudely, spot
bullshit at 25 paces. 
There is a third level, however, where 
the ability to think, to go beyond current
assumptions and beliefs and imagine a
diﬀerent future is all important. Healthcare
is an enveloping, all encompassing
environment for its professionals. It
socialises them from an early age with 
its language, norms, habits, rituals and
patterns of thought. 
More insidiously, we the public also 
ﬁnd ourselves aﬀected by the thinking,
ceding control of our health to the
practitioners. The result is the doctor,
disease and hospital centric health 
systems which exist in every wealthy
country — even though we know that 
we must focus on prevention and can 
see that such systems don’t work well 
for the elderly people with multiple needs
and pathologies who are the main users 
of the service and its greatest expense.
New ideas won’t come from within 
a service burdened by its own history 
and hobbled by vested interests. Insight
and inspiration can, however, come 
from poorer countries — in Africa and 
Asia — which without our resources 
and baggage are innovating, adapting 
and creating. Examples abound of 
newer cheaper technology, community
leadership — often from women — 
and shorter more focussed training 
of health workers. They may need our
science and resources but we need to 
turn the world of our assumptions upside
down and learn from their wisdom and
their experience. 
My brief exposure to philosophical
thinking has been helpful in this context 
by giving me the humility to understand
that there can be diﬀerent realities and 
the intellectual insight and curiosity to
explore them. 
Lord Nigel Crisp (St John’s 1970–73) is
an independent Cross Bench member
of the House of Lords. He was Chief
Executive of the NHS and Permanent
Secretary of the Department of Health
from 2000 to 2006. His latest book is
Turning the World Upside Down : the
search for global health in the 21st
century (RSM Press, 2010). 
Your comments and contributions
are always welcome. Please send
them to the Editor at:
Mrs Jenni Lecky-Thompson
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge
CB3 9DA
email: jel52@cam.ac.uk
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Fiction, Emotion, Imagination
Cain Todd
Future Events
Alumni Weekend 
24 September 2011
Professor Derek Matravers will 
give a talk on ‘Art and Morality’.
Further details will be available 
from the Alumni Weekend website
(www.alumni.cam.ac.uk/weekend)
FESTIVAL OF IDEAS 2011
Routledge Lecture in Philosophy:
Arguing about Torture
21 October 2011
Professor David Luban from
Georgetown University will examine
the ethical issues surrounding the 
use of torture by governments.
Happiness and Sustainability
28 October 2011
Professor John O’Neill from
Manchester University will look at
whether it is possible to maintain 
or improve well-being without
increasing consumption.
INAUGURAL LECTURE
‘When was Medieval Philosophy?’
30 November 2011
John Marenbon will give his 
inaugural lecture as Honorary
Professor of Medieval Philosophy.
Further details about these 
lectures will be available on the
Faculty website.
Aestheticians have spilled a lot of ink 
trying to resolve what has become 
known as the ‘paradox of ﬁction’, 
namely, the problem that we seem to 
have emotional responses to characters,
events and situations that we know to be
merely ﬁctional. We feel sad at the death 
of Anna Karenina or afraid of the Blair
Witch. Why? The puzzle is sharpened by
considering that our ordinary, everyday
emotional responses in non-ﬁctional
contexts appear to possess two essential
features that preclude their being directed
at ﬁction. First, they seem dependent in
some way on existential beliefs about 
the relevant objects and their properties.
For example, my fear of the approaching
lion will disappear if I discover that it is 
just a convincing hologram, or that it lacks
teeth and claws. Second, emotions seem
to be very closely tied to physiological
symptoms and action tendencies. To be 
in a state of genuine fear, for instance,
requires that I tremble, sweat, and that 
I be inclined to ﬂee or cower. Our
emotional responses to ﬁction seem 
to lack these features, at least to a
signiﬁcant degree.
Solutions to the ‘paradox’ range from 
the downright counterintuitive — such 
as denying that our ﬁction-directed
responses are genuine emotions —
to the deeply unsatisfying — such 
as regarding our responses as simply
irrational and inexplicable. The general
tendency, however, has been to deny, 
on the one hand, that genuine emotions
must be responses to beliefs, and to 
show that they can be responsive to
merely imaginary scenarios. On the 
other hand, philosophers have also 
come to acknowledge that even 
ﬁction-directed responses are not entirely
shorn of the relevant connections to
physiology and behaviour. The most
important and interesting recent impetus
here has come from philosophical and
psychological (including neuroscientiﬁc)
work on the nature of imagination 
and emotion. 
Antonio Damasio’s famous research 
on certain brain-damaged patients, 
for example, appears to demonstrate 
that our practical reasoning, involving
imagined scenarios concerning our 
own future decisions and actions, is
successful only insofar as it essentially
involves somatically encoded emotional
responses. The ability to respond
emotionally to the merely imaginary,
seems to be a fundamental feature of 
our cognitive apparatus. Moreover, a
plausible evolutionary — psychological
story can be told about the nature and
value of appreciating ﬁction in engaging
the imagination and emotions in just 
this way. For our appreciation of ﬁction
depends upon the exercise of cognitive
resources that play a fundamental role 
in human behaviour and well-being, 
and the engagement with ﬁction thus
oﬀers an important way of exercising 
and developing these capacities. 
Recent work on the emotions has 
also pointed in a similar direction, 
with psychologists demonstrating 
that certain emotional responses can 
be activated in response to mental
imagery, and also via sub-cognitive
processing i.e. without involving 
anything like the formation of beliefs.
Some prominent philosophical theories 
of the emotions take up this ‘non-
cognitive’ view of emotions and employ 
it directly as a solution to the paradox 
of ﬁction. They hold that our belief 
in the unreality of what we are 
responding to need not inhibit 
emotional responses. 
These connections between ﬁction,
imagination and emotion oﬀer a nice
demonstration of the productive
interaction of philosophy with the 
kind of empirical inquiry provided 
by psychology and other disciplines.
Nonetheless, despite the impressive
progress made on this problem, there
remains an insuﬃciently explained 
issue at the very heart of the paradox. 
Just how can one have an emotional
response of, say, fear, towards something
that is known, occurrently with the
emotional state, to be merely imaginary?
I think that an answer to this question
needs to explore the nature and role of
attention in our appreciation of ﬁction. 
Our ability to ‘bracket’ oﬀ the awareness 
of ﬁctionality — thereby becoming 
‘lost’ in the ﬁctional world — whilst
simultaneously appreciating something 
as a ﬁction, is a phenomenon we still 
need to account for if we wish to have 
a better understanding of the nature of
appreciation. 
Cain Todd (Trinity 1999–2003) is
Lecturer in Philosophy at Lancaster
University and a visiting researcher at
the University of Fribourg, Switzerland.
His latest book is The Philosophy of
Wine: a Case of Truth, Beauty and
Intoxication (Acumen, 2010). 
He gave a talk on ‘Fiction, Emotion 
and Imagination’ at the Cambridge
Festival of Ideas 2010.
I landed in Cambridge in 1986. Actually 
I came on the bus from  Scunthorpe but 
it felt alien enough to have needed an
aeroplane to arrive in such a peculiar 
place: blazers, tweed jackets, corduroy
trousers the colour of mustard, and
brogues whose ringing upon the paving
stones intermittently interrupted the
academic tranquillity of the courts. 
Having disembarked I went straight to 
St. John’s where I soon met my three
fellow philosophy students. I remember
Catherine Constable, tall and elegant,
serving early evening cocktails. She had 
a picture of Marlene Dietrich on her wall.
She’s now a Professor of Film Studies at the
University of Warwick. One of her books is
entitled: Thinking in Images: Film Theory,
Feminist Philosophy, and Marlene Dietrich
(BFI, 2005). Laura Susijn was engaged in 
a perpetual struggle to break free from 
the bonds of analytic philosophy. She 
was a bit of a hippy, just back from India.
After ﬁnishing at Cambridge she went 
to the Sorbonne to study Nietzsche,
subsequently setting up her own literary
agency, The Susijn Agency. Natasha Tahta
was the sane and sensible one amongst 
us. I recall her organising — plays, May
balls, everything it seemed.  Last I heard,
Natasha had gone on to a successful career
as a criminal barrister. 
of metaphysicians to make bold and
surprising claims about reality, claims
based upon what they perceived to be 
the theoretical beneﬁts or virtues of the
metaphysical schemes they proposed,
virtues broadly speaking shared with
respectable scientiﬁc theories.
The maelstrom of metaphysical
speculation that subsequently engulfed
the discipline during the 90s and the 00s
has now begun to wash back out to sea.
Metaphysicians are beginning to become
more circumspect, ‘meta-metaphysics’ 
has accordingly become a respectable
subject of enquiry. Looking back over the
years it seems to me that whilst Renford
was far from being right, he wasn’t entirely
wrong either. The ordinary language and
therapeutic approach to philosophy 
that he and Wisdom advanced arose 
as a response to the excesses of the 
logical atomism that preceded it.
Metaphysics of the style I have described
— an ‘ism’ for it still needs to be invented
— blew away the cobwebs and liberated 
us from the essentially conservative way 
of thinking associated with ordinary
language philosophy. But it took us 
too far in the other direction, made
philosophy too much like a crude
caricature of the natural sciences, and 
what we must do now is ﬁnd our 
way back.
Fraser MacBride completed his 
B.A. in 1989. He returned to 
Cambridge twenty years later to
become a University Lecturer in
Philosophy and a Fellow of Trinity 
Hall. He was previously a Reader 
in Philosophy at the University 
of St. Andrews and Birkbeck 
College, London.
Our Director of Studies was Renford
Bambrough. He was a disciple of John
Wisdom — a Cambridge professor of the
1950s and 60s whose work was inspired 
by the later Wittgenstein’s emphasis on
ordinary language and by G.E. Moore’s
common sense approach. For Bambrough
and Wisdom, philosophy as it should 
be practiced shared more in common 
with literary criticism and psychoanalysis
than mathematics or the natural sciences.
Renford’s task in supervisions was to
inoculate us against the diseases of 
the intellect with which traditional
philosophy threatened to infect us,
especially metaphysics. This impression 
of what philosophy should be was
conﬁrmed the following year when 
Richard Rorty came to deliver the 
Tarner lectures at Trinity (later published 
as Contingency, Irony and Solidarity 
(CUP, 1989), lectures that included 
inter alia a sweeping deconstruction 
of the very idea of ‘Truth’ and the notion
that ‘Reality’ had its own independent
structure. The wider academic community
outside philosophy departments took
note: the announcement that metaphysics
was dead echoed about. But unlike the
Soviet Union or the apartheid system 
that were soon to collapse, metaphysics
wasn’t on its last legs; in fact it was about
to stride forth invigorated, renewed with 
a second youth. 
Many factors contributed to its
resurgence, but one important event
through which the Zeitgeist channeled 
its energies was the publication of a 
work by the Princeton philosopher 
David Lewis: On the Plurality of Worlds
(OUP, 1986). Lewis argued that when 
we ordinarily talk about how our lives
could have turned out diﬀerently we are
talking about other people whose lives
really did turn out that way — only people
who inhabit regions of space and time 
that can’t be reached from our neck of 
the woods. He raised plenty of eyebrows
saying this; it was really a breathtaking
achievement on Lewis’ part to still
convince so many philosophers that 
his theory of possible worlds exhibited 
the beneﬁts of unity and economy 
that outweighed the cost of oﬀending
intuition, or at least made it a serious
question whether the cost didn’t 
outweigh the beneﬁts. Lewis thereby
opened the way for a new generation 
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